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THE RELATION BETWEEN THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF CAM 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE 
REGULATION OF BIOMEDICAL 
RESEARCH
Marie- Andrée Jacob1
em·pir·ic
n.
1 a person who relies on empirical methods
2 (Medicine) a medical quack; charlatan
adj.
empirical.
(Collins English Dictionary, HarperCollins, 2003)
I Introduction
Knowledge, law, and the state are intimately connected. The advancement of knowledge 
through research and development is never completely lawless (Stokes 2012, Golan 2004); 
instead, it often emerges with the support of an array of regulatory apparatuses, audit practices, 
and public subsidies. In turn, policies, and legislative and judicial decisions are increasingly 
developed under the influence of experts in various bodies of knowledge (Fischer 1990, Irwin 
2008).
 However, the state is not neutral vis- à-vis all ‘forms of knowledge’ as taken in their broadest 
sense (de Camargo 2002, Casey and Picherack 2001). In fact, it simply could not be. State 
recognition and support rather tend to be geared towards formal knowledge, understood as a 
‘cognitive content acquired from formal education, professional practice or technoscientific 
literature’ (de Camargo 2002: 828). The type of knowledge that the state is interested and 
invested in is actually even more restricted than that: more often than not it refers to bodies of 
knowledge that live up to what are commonly recognized as ‘scientific standards’. This is par-
ticularly patent in the context of health care, where policymakers increasingly use evidence- 
based medicine (EBM) as a basis for decision- making. In order to receive the state imprimatur, 
diagnostic methods and therapies ought to prove efficient according to conventional medicine’s 
scientific standards, especially the randomized clinical trial (RCT) method. Legal scholar Ireh 
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Iyioha thus aptly speaks of a ‘nexus between statutory legitimacy and scientific validation of 
health systems’ (2011: 1; see also Polich et al. 2010).
 It might not come as a surprise, then, that in the eyes of the public, scientists, like politicians, 
bureaucrats, and businessmen, are under increased scrutiny. The public now demands integrity, 
accountability, and transparency from all spheres of public life. Hence the science–law–state 
nexus is itself up for grabs. This is part of the context in which complementary and alternative 
medicine (CAM) researchers currently work.
 In this chapter, I am interested in CAM as a mode of knowledge production, and in how 
CAM and the ‘state law’s espousal of science’ (Santos 2002, Iyohia 2011) negotiate each other. 
The chapter aims to explain the way the state–knowledge–law nexus operates in the context of 
CAM, to identify tensions and potential in that operation, and finally to point towards an altern-
ative model/pathway that might allow the alternative knowledge base (or disciplinary ecology) 
of CAM to have a greater impact on its own patterns of governance. I hope the chapter will 
invite a reflection on how CAM mimics and resists mainstream biomedicine in the context of 
research, and about the way legitimation can iron out distinctiveness.
 I come to CAM research’s engagement to regulation from the perspectives of socio- legal 
studies. To be brief, socio- legal scholarship is an interdisciplinary field that has long assumed an 
outsider’s perspective on law (Riles 1994) as well as an interest in ‘law in action’ as much as in 
‘law in the books’. Socio- legal scholars have examined the way law (mainly positive law, see 
Constable 2008) is experienced in its ‘trenches’, that is, from below, or from an outlaw’s per-
spectives. More recently, socio- legal scholars have also began to study law’s ‘ivory towers’ – that 
is, they have approached law by self- consciously describing it from the top down by paying 
attention to the actors that craft law’s legitimacy and power. Some socio- legal scholars have 
employed their empirical, theoretical, doctrinal, and critical tools to examine the relationship 
between law and other privileged professions, such as medicine (Feldman 2000, Jacob 2012, 
Cloatre 2013). The field of socio- legal studies also increasingly converses with science and tech-
nology studies (Valverde 2003, Faulkner et al. 2012, Cloatre and Pickersgill 2014).
 This chapter is based on a literature review on the topic and does not provide empirical 
claims, although it is inspired by fieldwork begun in 2010 in the milieu of research governance 
(Jacob 2014).2 With respect to the concept of knowledge of biomedical and CAM research, I try 
to adopt a middle- ground approach: I aim to surpass the rehearsed distinctions found in legisla-
tion and policies about scientific vs. non- scientific knowledge, and to encompass less formal and 
official modes of knowing, but I do not aim to discuss high- level epistemological debates as to 
what counts or should count as ‘knowledge’. I hope readers will forgive the loose ways with 
which I engage with that division. In fact, if you are reading this handbook you are probably 
accustomed to this problem and struggle with it, as it seems endemic to any conversation about 
CAM. So, what indeed does constitute CAM knowledge?
II CAM knowledge and CAM rhetoric
Historian Roberta Bivins suggests that to have medical systems, theories, and practices that can 
‘be regarded as “alternative” one must have a recognized, definable, and at least relatively stable 
orthodoxy to which they oppose themselves’ (Bivins 2010: 171). In other words, the world of 
CAM itself would be founded on a binary, as discussed in the introduction to this handbook. 
This is illustrated at several junctures in this chapter. In practice, Bivins’ observation means that 
‘boundary- work’ constitutes, unavoidably, an important part of the self- fashioning of CAM 
knowledge. Initially, ‘boundary- work’ (Gieryn 1983) referred to the discursive practices of sci-
entists as they stress their difference and superiority over less ‘authoritative’ forms of non- scientific 
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knowledge. Since then, it has been interpreted more broadly, as a strategy taken up by a group, 
an institution, or profession (Gieryn 1983, Thomson 2013), to assert its epistemic authority, or 
perhaps even more generally its distinction, by working out boundaries around its expertise. 
Gieryn calls the resulting boundaries ‘lines in the sand’, hence highlighting how strategic and 
volatile they are. CAM proponents have shown up their distinct contribution in such ways.
 For instance, the entire venture of CAM could not exist without a mode of opposition. 
Seventeenth- century ‘empiricism’, which was an alternative to the mainstream medicine of the 
time, explicitly showcased ‘the promise of freedom, the bolster against tyranny, and the endorse-
ment of individual ambition’, and was associated with subversiveness against dogmas (Benedict 
2001: 26–7). One interpretation of the genealogy of CAM knowledge (in the Western world) 
is that it emerged in the nineteenth century out of the holistic movement from within medicine, 
based on alternate models in medicine, including the biopsychosocial model. The tone of the 
proponents was resolutely oppositional. Holist thinkers also rapidly distanced themselves not 
only from orthodox, reductionist medicine, but from notions of ‘medical progress’ and modern 
technological civilization. They also criticized what they saw as the dehumanization of society 
(Weisz 1998: 75). Rosenberg notes that, throughout the twentieth century, well- known ‘jere-
miads against fragmentation, alienation, against reductionism of market- oriented social relations’ 
(1998: 337) have at once paralleled and supported different forms of medical holism, such as the 
one put forward by some CAM approaches.
 In addition, scholars of CAM have marshalled distinctions and binaries coming from within 
the field of CAM itself. Historian Roy Porter (1989) has provided the very useful distinction 
between the rhetoric and the practice of CAM. Self- fashioning is critical in the field. The very 
term ‘alternative’ carries positive baggage and can almost immunise CAM to critique in some 
ways. Who can be against a medicine that does things differently, is more informal, humane, 
context based?3 The term ‘natural’, which is often associated with CAM, carries its own 
normative load (Anderson 2010). CAM researchers have described themselves as being ‘on the 
edge’ (Polich et al. 2010: 112). Note that in the context of this chapter, we should be wary not 
to associate CAM with necessarily progressive views and cutting- edge critiques of research and 
regulation, as CAM is also likely to produce romantic, conservative approaches to research 
which are suspicious of the mainstream for regressive, back- to-nature kinds of reasons.
 Those who study CAM ought to pay attention to its alignment with the powerful rhetoric 
of alternativeness, and analyse them against CAM practices that can be rather conformist, 
mainstream, and mercantile (Porter 1989). CAM researchers have been agile at negotiating the 
boundaries between CAM and biomedicine, and position their CAM research on the spectrum 
of CAM therapies (Polich et al. 2010, Wolffram 2010). To do this, CAM researchers use ‘sci-
entific terminology’, de- emphasize certain aspects of their work, highlight their ‘conventional-
ity’ (Polich et al. 2010: 113), and compare themselves to the less mainstream, that is, distance 
themselves from alternative medicine and see themselves as closer to norms of biomedical 
research. Note that the boundary- work is also mobilized in opposite ways, in order to emphasize 
the dividends of the ‘difference’ that CAM offers (Micollier 2011: 59). These positionings, as we 
will see, extend to the engagement of CAM researchers with research regulation, and hence 
they are at the centre of this chapter.
 The science- culture is another binary that is critical to the self- making rhetoric of CAM 
research. CAM researchers confront the assumption, particularly tenacious, that science is 
culture- free. Interestingly science and technology studies scholars have used the metaphor of 
magic to describe how science has managed to remain cut off from culture: ‘laboratory science 
. . . still moves around the globe like a fetish, with its social relations conveniently erased. It 
seems to arrive with capitalism, “like a ship,” then magically arrive elsewhere, just as powerful, 
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packaged, and intact’ (Anderson and Adams 2008: 182). This particular account might be over-
stating the point, but it rightfully directs to the problems faced by knowledge that stands outside 
the ‘intactness’ of science. CAM knowledge, in contrast to science, is perceived as belonging to 
the sticky realm of culture, of religion and magic (Langford 1999). As mentioned above, CAM 
researchers often use boundary- work to distance themselves from culture and align themselves 
with science.
 However, again, we ought to remain careful not to caricature the difference between bio-
medicine and CAM. Science is increasingly aware of its cultural specificity and attuned to post-
modernism (see Saks 1998). As an illustration, the Cochrane Collaboration defines CAM as a 
domain of healing resources ‘other than those intrinsic to the politically dominant health system 
of a particular society or culture in a given historical period’ (Zollman and Vickers 1999: 693). 
‘Boundaries’, as it reads in this British Medical Journal article, ‘between the CAM domain and that 
of the dominant system are not always sharp or fixed’ (Zollman and Vickers 1999: 693).
 In the next sections, I will discuss the connection, and possible mismatch, between CAM 
research and the regulatory benchmarks of science – in particular, the randomized controlled 
trial. This dissonance is illustrated, but also modulated, when looking at state- sanctioned hierar-
chies of evidence. Next, I will contextualize the discussion within the larger issue of the state’s 
commitment towards science. I will conclude that. contrary to common wisdom, the norms and 
practices of CAM research make it more similar in form and technique to biomedical research 
than we might think. The puzzle for CAM, then, may well lie in how to translate the alterna-
tiveness of its knowledge into genuinely alternative research practices. CAM knowledge- makers 
might ask themselves whether they can and should contribute to further defining what it means 
to produce trustworthy knowledge, or enacting alternative research regulation.
III The regulation of non- CAM research and the scienticization of CAM
Let me turn to an overview of how non- CAM and CAM research is regulated. Mike Saks 
points out how the increase in scandals and misconduct in orthodox medicine (and arguably, 
medical research) has benefited CAM by keeping the spotlight on the deficiencies of the ethics 
and methods of orthodox medicine (Saks 2003; and see Porter 1989).4 However, in the current 
climate of rising scrutiny from the public towards science, and of growing demands for account-
ability and transparency in all public spheres, there are higher expectations about regulation and 
scrutiny in CAM research as well (Mills 2001).
 Let us note at the outset that various commentators have highlighted that contemporary 
Western biomedicine is increasingly standardized (Timmermans and Berg 2003). The standards 
in question vary greatly; they can be mandated by state law, but can also be the product of 
private governance (Faulkner et al. 2012). The diversity in standards means that highly standard-
ized medicine is not necessarily a more standard or universal medicine (Timmermans and Epstein 
2010). The concept of ‘regulatory objectivity’ was crafted to refer to this currently dominant 
model of medicine (Cambrosio et al. 2006, Lewis and Atkinson 2011). ‘Regulatory objectivity’ 
is a new form of objectivity in biomedicine that generates conventions and norms through con-
certed programmes of action based on the use of a variety of systems for the collective produc-
tion of evidence (Cambrosio et al. 2009: 651). In line with the insights of science and technology 
studies, the theorists of ‘regulatory objectivity’ alert us to ensuing changes to biomedicine itself, 
not only to its so- called external regulatory environment. In other words, the regulatory frame-
works on safety, human subjects, and so on (to which I turn to next) that may seem external to 
and imposed on biomedicine are in fact more and more built- in biomedicine. So- called external 
regulation from the field of law and ethics gets enmeshed with layers of intrinsic categorizations, 
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classifications, and measurement regimes (Lezaun 2012), and thus co- produce biomedical know-
ledge itself ( Jasanoff 2008). Today, research is governed ex ante through state, research councils, 
and sponsor guidelines, but also ex post, through state, non- state, and self- regulatory responses 
to scientific misconduct, as outlined below (EMRC 2011, ESF 2010).
1 Ex ante
The Declaration of Helsinki, drawn in 1964 but revised several times since 2008, is the first 
international instrument setting out principles governing research with human participants, 
whether mainstream biomedical or CAM research. The principles of the Declaration derive 
from the Nuremberg Code, drafted by judges in the Nuremberg Trial of Nazi war criminals.
 Since then, the regulation of medical research, at the international, regional, and national 
level, has become a ‘growth industry’ whose voluminous documentation ironically comes in the 
way of good research practice (Mason and Laurie 2013: 648; see also Jacob and Riles 2007). The 
internationalization of research has complicated matters further (Anderson and Steneck 2011) by 
expanding even more the number and levels of regulation. It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to offer a comprehensive précis of all the regulatory requirements that apply to modern 
research.
 In Europe, the Additional Protocol to the Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine 
Concerning Biomedical Research (2005) sets principles governing research with human 
participants. The Forum for National Ethics Council attempts to coordinate ethical reflection 
and to raise and maintain regulatory standards in medical research. The European Directive of 
2001 relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials on 
medicinal products for human use has been implemented by member states. It has been criticized 
by professional bodies for causing a drop in clinical trials in Europe (Mason and Laurie 2013: 
650, and see further below). In July 2012, the European Commission’s proposal for a new 
European Clinical Trials Regulation replacing the Directive has been adopted. This new 
Regulation is expected to come into effect in 2016.
 The UK regulatory framework of clinical research in the UK is not a coherent, across- the-
board set of regulations (Dixon- Woods 2010). The main concerns of the UK legal framework 
and ‘research governance culture’ (Mason and Laurie 2013: 656) involve responsibility and 
accountability, as well as consent of participants. Since 1968, following the recommendation of 
the Medical Research Council, the regulation of medical research consisted of ethics committees 
(Boden et al. 2009, citing Committee of Privy Council for Medical Research 1964). The 
constitution of these local research ethics committees was sporadic and uneven until the first 
piece of formal guidance from the Department of Health in 1991 (Brazier and Cave 2011). The 
first UK piece of legislation consisted of the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004 (amended since) implementing the European Directive. The Department of Health 
published its Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care in 2001, with an 
update in 2005. The Framework establishes the principle of good research governance and 
clarifies the arrangements for research ethics committees, in line with the legacy of the Declaration 
of Helsinki. An annex published in 2008 provides detailed guidance for areas of research that 
activate the application of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 or the Human Tissue Act 2004.
 Another body of ‘legislation, guidance and policy’ (MHRA website 2012) is applied by the 
Inspection, Enforcement and Standards Division of the Medicine and Healthcare Products Reg-
ulatory Agency. The MHRA provides oversight over research in the form of trials on medicinal 
products, including herbal and homeopathic medicines. This set of regulation is thus relevant 
for CAM research and responds to three main stated policy concerns: first, the protection of 
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subjects who participate in this research; second, the public interest in the safety of research; and 
third, the promotion of the research industry. The first two concerns are translated in licensing 
authorities that oversee research (Hervey and McHale 2004). However, the MHRA does not 
have oversight over research ethics committees. The third policy concern about the importance 
of promoting research industry is translated in regulatory requirements of speediness in the 
licensing and approval processes. The Good Clinical Research Practice Inspectorate is respons-
ible for inspections of research practices (MHRA website 2012).
 Recently, criticisms over the over- regulation of research have been voiced and, in 2010, the 
UK government mandated the Academy of Medical Sciences (AMS) to review the regulation 
of research with a view of radically simplifying the oversight process. Approximately at the same 
time though, the National Institute for Health Research published a new standards framework 
for local NHS research management. The stated objectives related to: ‘Bureaucracy – cut red 
tape and gold- plating of regulation; Accountability – enable the public to hold public bodies to 
account; Efficiency – cut the costs of administration; and Autonomy – enable front line staff to 
use their professional judgment’.
 In December 2011, the NHS launched a new organization with special authority, the Health 
Research Authority (HRA), whose purpose is to protect and promote the interests of patients 
and the public in health research. The HRA intends to work closely with the MHRA to ‘create 
a unified approval process and to promote proportionate standards for compliance and inspec-
tion within a consistent national system of research governance’ (HRA website 2012) The work 
of the National Research Ethics Service and of the National Information Governance Board’s 
Ethics and Confidentiality Committee has now transferred to the new HRA.
 Another body of rules that concerns both CAM and non- CAM research constitutes legisla-
tion regarding the transparency of public bodies (including publicly funded activities) and the 
handling of personal data. The remit of these legislations (Freedom of Information Act 2000, the 
Environmental Information Regulations5 and the Data Protection Act 1998) far extends the 
domain of scientific research, and their importance was highlighted recently (House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee 2011, Russell 2010). Research using personal data (for 
instance, patient data or samples obtained previously for another purposes) also needs to comply 
with the laws concerning privacy and confidentiality, as well as with relevant sections of the 
Human Tissue Act 2004 and its Codes of Practice, and related cases (Lowrance 2012, Mason 
and Laurie 2013). These legislative instruments all have the consent of the research participant 
as their ‘primary policy device’ (Mason and Laurie 2013: 679), while regulators such as the 
Health Research Authority’s Confidentiality Advisory Group in the UK work to strike a balance 
between consent and the public interest value of research.
 The Medicines Act 1968 sets its own requirements as to the quality, safety, and efficacy of 
medicines before they can be manufactured and put on the market. These regulatory require-
ments are significant to the ways researchers and their sponsors ought to conduct research on 
medicinal products. Herbal remedies and homeopathic products can be treated as ordinary 
medicinal products, but they also have access to a different scheme, the Traditional Herbal 
Medicine Registration Scheme (THMRS), which only requires proof of quality and safety, but 
not efficacy. Instead of efficacy (itself a contested term, which I will discuss below), other indi-
cators are used, such as proof of traditional use for various lengths of time ( Jackson 2012: 8–18). 
Such distinct product recognition thresholds signal different, somewhat ‘weaker’ ( Jackson 2012: 
12) legal expectations for researchers, sponsors, and manufacturers of complementary and altern-
ative medicines than for biomedical researchers working on conventional medicines.
 The industry and other prominent research funders (the Medical Research Council and the 
Wellcome Trust in the UK, and the National Institutes of Health in the US) have enacted their 
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own guidelines for the good conduct of research. In addition, the work of the researchers who 
are registered medics is governed by the General Medical Council (GMC), via its Guidance 
Good Practice in Research (2010) and Consent to Research (2010). Irrespective of the disciplines used 
in their research, researchers who are also registered professionals are bound by their regulatory 
bodies. Thus, in an analogous manner to medical researchers being regulated by the GMC, 
CAM researchers who are, say, licensed nurses, chiropractors, or osteopaths have their profes-
sional work regulated by their respective professional self- regulatory bodies (see McHale, this 
volume, Saks, this volume). In addition, complementary health care practitioners are repres-
ented as well as regulated by various groups, including the national voluntary regulator Com-
plementary and Natural Healthcare Council, and others like the British Acupuncture Council 
or the Society of Homeopaths.
 Last but not least is the requirement for clinical trials registration as a measure to maintain the 
integrity and transparency of research (Horton and Smith 1999, Abbasi 2004). In 2004, a con-
sortium of medical journals, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE), 
announced that all trials must register in a public trials registry as soon as it starts patient enrol-
ment, in order to be considered for publication in those journals. It is increasingly recognized 
that underreporting of research can also be a form of research misconduct (Chalmers 1990). 
There are public trials registries, such as www.clinicaltrials.gov, which is sponsored by the US 
National Library of Medicine. In the UK, policy for mandatory registration and reporting of all 
clinical trials has been implemented via the National Institute for Health Research Clinical 
Research Network (NIHR CRN) Portfolio, a database of high- quality clinical research studies 
that are eligible for support from the NIHR Clinical Research Network in England in the UK. 
These have entry criteria that are often not met by many clinical trials conducted worldwide. 
There are also private trials registries, such as the International Standard Randomised Controlled 
Trial Number (ISRCTN) registry, hosted by the commercial company Current Controlled 
Trials (www.controlled- trials.com). These are freely available to the public.
2 Ex post
The UK does not have state regulations overseeing publication, authenticity, and conflicts of 
interests in research practice. However, different advisory bodies have attempted to define 
research integrity (Jacob 2013) and to apply definitions to real- life cases. For instance, an inter-
national charity which started as a local group in London, the Committee on Publication Ethics 
(COPE), is providing advice to editors about good practice and research integrity in publishing. 
Many national or regional agencies, such as the UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO), act as 
advisory bodies for researchers and the researchers’ institutions, whereas their US, Danish, and 
Norwegian counterparts6 have regulatory as well as advisory powers (ENRIO 2014). Research 
funders also publish guidance about research integrity. Various possible regulatory and non- 
regulatory responses to occurrences of research misconduct are increasingly debated in the UK,7 
as well as internationally.
 The three- prong definition of research misconduct was initially comprised of fabrication, falsi-
fication, and plagiarism (LaFollette 1992), but it has since expanded to include: ghostwriting, gift 
authorship, non- disclosure of conflict of interests, and data editing (Edmond 2008). It has been 
argued that biotechnologies themselves have prompted novel regulatory and ethical problems 
(Oliver and Montgomery 2009). For instance, technological breakthroughs generate new ethical 
questions about genetic engineering, cloning, reproductive rights, and informed consent; indus-
try–university joint ventures pose problems of conflict of interests and disclosure of financial agree-
ments; advances in electronic publication prompt questions about proprietary knowledge and 
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authorship claims. According to this view, the traditional and ‘natural’ aspects of CAM would 
make it less vulnerable to certain newer forms of research misconduct. But note that research 
misconduct is not in itself a new issue: for instance, the falsification of data is an old problem which 
can now be expressed in new forms – for example, via image or gels manipulation. In this sense, 
there is no reason to think that CAM research is immune to basic forms of research misconduct.
 In the US context, it has been argued that there is a lack of regulatory oversight of CAM 
therapies (e.g. chiropractic, acupuncture, traditional oriental medicine, and massage therapy) 
with respect to the protection of human subjects and of animal populations (Cohen and Sch-
achter 2004). From a scoping overview of the field thus far, it is notable from the outset that 
CAM researchers have in general created little infrastructure for implementing research integrity 
and dealing with research misconduct.
 In the field of publication ethics, a recent study on journals retractions published in Medline 
(Wager and Williams 2011) found no retraction coming from CAM journals during 1998–2008 
(although it is important to note that not all CAM journals are published on Medline). Between 
1997 and 2011, amongst the hundreds of reported cases discussed by the Committee on Publi-
cation Ethics (COPE),8 only one relates to CAM: a case of homeopathy research on AIDS.
 Despite the Complementary and Natural Healthcare Council’s own statement that decisions 
made by the investigations committee on conduct and competence will be made available on its 
website, as of December 2012, no conduct and competence cases had been reported (let alone 
research conduct cases) on the online database.9 As US research integrity experts Rennie and 
Gunsalus (2008: 30) suggest, in the context of research misconduct, an absence of reported cases 
is more likely to signal a lack of oversight than the absence of misconduct. There is, however, 
some evidence of infrastructure – for instance, at the National Council for Osteopathic Research, 
which has published a Research Governance Framework in 2007. The Health Professions 
Council (which is not a specifically CAM regulator, but regulates, amongst others, art and music 
therapists) has an easily accessible database of all fitness- to-practice cases, including those related 
to research activities.
 The engagement of CAM research with regulation that we have reviewed so far indicates a 
one- way, top- down regulator–regulatee relationship, one in which a body of knowledge and 
knowledge- makers is under regulatory oversight. What kinds of regulatory conversations are 
taking place between CAM researchers and state and non- state regulators of research?
IV Regulatory engagements
The chapter now turns to exploring how CAM research fares in a highly standardized world, and 
in the face of biomedicine tailored by ‘regulatory objectivity’ as referred to earlier. Critical ques-
tions to be addressed include: Does the claimed ‘alternativeness’ of the knowledge base of CAM 
demand alternative definitions of research conduct and of research governance? In CAM and 
non- CAM contexts, how do people innovate by crafting alternative and complementary regula-
tory frameworks? Is the field of CAM not an ideal place to begin to rethink the way trustworthy 
knowledge is produced? Can CAM contribute to thinking about the ways in which research 
should get regulated by state and non- state actors? Indeed, the idea of an alternative way to do 
medicine that could positively inspire an alternative way to regulate is not new. This idea 
developed more than a decade ago, when pioneering legal scholars of CAM, Julie Stone and Joan 
Matthews, pointed out the need for a ‘holistic regulation’ (1996: 291) and ‘spectrum approach to 
regulation’ (215) as a way to govern complementary medicine. Despite all this, in the context of 
CAM, the idea of an alternative mode of caring and doing research has not yet triggered a pro-
found rethinking of the idea of research governance and research conduct. Interestingly, the term 
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‘holistic research governance’ was used recently in a leading medical law textbook (Mason and 
Laurie 2013: 679) in reference to new approaches to regulating research that emphasize a broader 
engagement with ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of biomedicine and to a reflexive 
governance approach that sees research as a partnership between researchers and participants.10
 The CAM literature is divided as to whether CAM research should follow the same standards 
as Western biomedical research: some highlight the ‘mismatch’ between CAM knowledge and 
the randomized control trial, as mentioned above, and some, to the contrary, go to great lengths 
to explain the need for robust RCT to provide a research base for CAM knowledge. The 2008 
Report of the Department of Health Steering Group on the Statutory Regulation of Practition-
ers of Acupuncture, Herbal Medicine, Traditional Chinese Medicine and Other Traditional 
Medicine Systems Practised in the UK (the ‘DH Steering Group’) illustrates the ambivalence of 
CAM proponents towards the ‘regulatory’ force (Cambrosio et al. 2006, Micollier 2011) of the 
RCT. In its discussion of the need for a ‘robust evidence base’ for these practices, the Steering 
Group interestingly refers specifically to the European Directive on Traditional Herbal Medici-
nal Products, which notes that: ‘The long tradition of the medicinal product makes it possible 
to reduce the need for clinical trials insofar as the efficacy of the medicinal product is plausible 
on the basis of long- standing use and experience.’11 Yet, when the ‘hard’ evidence of rand-
omized clinical trials is available and shows the internal and external validity of a technique (for 
example, for Chinese herbal medicine and acupuncture) (DH Steering Group 2008: 26), the 
Steering Group seems to uncritically embrace this RCT evidence, and finds it ‘essential’ in 
order ‘to establish further the safety and effectiveness of these forms of intervention’ (DH Steer-
ing Group 2008: 25). Whilst RCT could be thought essential for the further establishment of 
safety and effectiveness without being thought essential for establishing the efficacy of a CAM 
product, reducing the need for RCTs and then claiming that they are essential for establishing 
effectiveness sounds contradictory.
 In addition, looking at what CAM researchers had to say about complementary and altern-
ative ways of knowing and researching, there appears to be a high degree of methodological and 
theoretical conservatism in the writings on research ethics (Ernst 1994, 1996, Van Haselen 2006, 
Tilburt and Kaptchuk 2008), including, for instance, a straightforward application of the four 
bioethical principles of Beauchamp and Childress (autonomy, justice, beneficience, non- 
maleficience) as a basis for research ethics (Ernst 1996).12 Social scientific and in particular 
science and technology studies work on CAM seem by far more critical of how knowledge is 
researched, regulated, and marketed both in RCT and in CAM contexts (Adams 2002, Kim 
2007). In other words, whilst there could be a window of opportunity for more critical distanc-
ing from the mainstream model of building and governing research, in academic CAM journals, 
for instance, what one finds is rather a repeating of the well- rehearsed axioms of mainstream 
biomedical and bioethical thinking (Cohen and Schacter 2004, Mills 2001). As often is the case 
in legitimation through regulation, when one might expect to see alternative regulatory prin-
ciples and ethical frameworks, what one gets is rather the reinforcing of mainstream norms.
V Resistance or compliance? Randomized controlled trials and their ir/
relevance to CAM
In 2000, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology stated:
Very little high- quality CAM research exists; reasons for this may include: a lack of 
training in the principles and methods of research; inadequate research funding and a 
poor research infrastructure within the CAM sector. Another contributing factor may 
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be methodological issues, with many CAM practitioners believing that conventional 
research methods are not suitable tools with which to investigate CAM.
A major implication of the ‘regulatory objectivity’ referred to above is medicine’s normative 
commitment to the RCT as gold standard for both conventional biomedicine and CAM (Cam-
brosio et al. 2006, Moreira and Will 2010).
 Still CAM researchers and practitioners have long highlighted the differences between bio-
medical and CAM knowledge, and complained about the limits and inadequacy of biomedical 
‘evidence base’ methods to evaluate CAM therapies. At the outset, CAM researchers and prac-
titioners sometimes use ‘terms and ideas that are not easily translated into Western scientific 
language’ (Zollman and Vickers 1999: 695). They have advocated a ‘methodological pluralism’ 
(Callahan 2004, Cohen 2003) to account for the epistemological diversity that characterizes 
medical knowledge broadly understood, including different forms of CAM. To them, biomedi-
cal research methods – including their gold standard, the randomized controlled trial – despite 
adequately testing biomedical treatments and drugs, are ill suited to properly assess many CAM 
therapies.
 In order to prove its efficacy and effectiveness under the terms of modern scientific standards, 
research in CAM must often stay in synch with the dominant scientific paradigms of the time, 
and science’s own theoretical conservatism. Within the scientific paradigm, researchers in CAM 
thus often have to proceed against these hierarchies of evidence, and literally reverse the norm-
ative order of biomedical testing. For instance, the biomedical investigation of a drug usually 
proceeds from chemical and animal experiments first, then moves on to clinical experiments. In 
order to align themselves with these biomedical conventions, some researchers in Korean 
medicine and Chinese medicine, for example, have translated their observations and anecdotes, 
in other words their clinical evidence, into chemical and animal experiments (Kim 2007: 871, 
Lei 1999). By doing so, these CAM researchers attempt to show the scientific relevance of their 
alternative, so- called ‘cultural’ knowledge capital to the biomedical community, whilst at the 
same time building on that biomedical community’s own cultural tradition.
 The RCT gold standard also shows its epistemological limitations if we further problematize 
the binary that posits CAM’s personalization of medicine in opposition to the standardization of 
Western biomedicine. For instance, a temporary look at what CAM and mainstream medicine 
have in common, rather than at what sets them apart, can highlight a misalignment between the 
RCT and what it is cut to measure in both CAM and mainstream medicine. It may not be possible 
to translate faithfully the long- term clinical and experiential evidence developed in traditional and 
indigenous forms of medicine into scientific knowledge through a short- term RCT. But the 
RCT is not limited solely with respect to assessing CAM. Analogies have been drawn in this sense 
between CAM and the medical specialization of surgery. To assess the validity of surgery, it is not 
advisable to rely on clinical trials; instead, it needs to be experienced, that is, done again and again, 
hands- on, as well as taught and observed by peers over many years (Institute of Medicine 2005). 
In surgery, medical value and knowledge is attributed to a specific person, healer or professional, 
who performs the therapeutic act in question. In the field of surgery, the same procedure done by 
an experienced surgeon is not the same as by any other surgeon (Institute of Medicine 2005: 126). 
A given procedure, which can be scientifically proven as efficacious, might be effective only if a 
specific, experienced surgeon performs it. This is likely to also be the case with many CAM thera-
pies. The CAM–surgery analogy further shows the slipperiness of the binary between CAM and 
science as they are ordinarily understood.
 At this point, it is worth having a look at state- sanctioned hierarchies of evidence, which high-
light the issues of the difficulty of differentiating biomedical knowledge from CAM knowledge, 
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and the limits of evidence methods to trace such boundaries. The hierarchies of evidence can also 
offer a point of entry for opening a larger debate on the relevance of finding a scientific basis 
for CAM.
 State- sanctioned hierarchies ‘rate the strength of a body of published data on a specific test or 
treatment’, for the purpose of providing ‘recommendations’ for the use of ‘preventive interven-
tions in office- based clinical practice’ (Institute of Medicine 2005: 94–5). Clinic practitioners, 
health organizations, and ‘patients’ or ‘payers’ tend to pay close attention to them. In CAM in 
the United States (2005), the Institute of Medicine (IOM) discussed how these state- sanctioned 
hierarchies of knowledge get negotiated and used. In the UK, according to the National Health 
Service’s Centre for Evidence- Based Medicine, the hierarchy of evidence depends on ‘the study 
design, the number of studies in the body of evidence, and the consistency of study results’ 
(Institute of Medicine 2005: 96). The UK hierarchy of study designs suggests the following 
descending order:
the combined results of several randomized controlled clinical trials (RCTs) receive 
the greatest weight in evaluating treatment effectiveness. The results of a single, well-
 designed RCT is given the next greatest weight. The combined results of observational 
studies or other non- RCT study designs comes next, followed by case series or 
anecdotal reports, and professional judgment or consensus.
(Institute of Medicine 2005: 96)
By contrast to the UK hierarchy, the US Preventive Services Task Force (under the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, Department of Health and Human Services) does not hierar-
chize methods per se: ‘it does not use a hierarchy of study designs ranging from the most 
powerful (randomized clinical trials) to the weakest (case series)’. Instead, it uses the generic 
characteristics of a study (e.g. ‘well designed’) (Institute of Medicine 2005: 94–5). In theory, this 
would means that a rigorous, ‘well designed’ case series, if suited to evaluate a given treatment, 
could rank high in the hierarchy. In addition, the hierarchy is described as a ‘hierarchy of rating 
of the strengths of recommendations’ rather than of evidence.
 In another report, the Institute of Medicine (2001) explained how the distinction between 
treatment effectiveness and treatment efficacy can affect levels of evidence. Whereas efficacy 
refers to the ability to produce measurable desired medical results in ‘experts’ hands’ – that is, in 
laboratories or in controlled contexts like the RCT – effectiveness refers to this ability in the 
daily routine practice of medicine, with unselected clinicians and patients. In other words, effi-
cacy is about what a treatment can do in ideal circumstances, and effectiveness is what it actually 
does in daily use.13 In the milieu, it parallels the distinction between explanatory studies (focused 
on efficacy) and pragmatic studies (focused on effectiveness). Namely, the IOM states that, if 
evaluating treatment effectiveness, ‘the results of a single well- designed outcomes study should 
be considered to be as compelling as the results of a single well- controlled randomized trial’ 
(Institute of Medicine 2001). This modulation by the IOM on levels of evidence, induced by 
the efficacy vs. effectiveness distinction, highlights the methodological need to examine the 
practical and subjective aspects of treatment. This could be read, in principle, as an approach 
more sympathetic to CAM. However, efficacy and effectiveness are understood as not exclusive 
of each other, but cumulative. Hence proving both efficiency and effectiveness can constitute a 
high threshold for CAM therapies to meet. For instance, a narrow study of physiological value 
(efficacy) of a CAM technique or treatment would say little about its effectiveness in real prac-
tice, although it could still produce a body of evidence that would give it credit (see Weisz 
2011). It has been noted that, because of the placebo effect, any non- efficacious technique or 
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treatment could be found to be effective in certain situations (UK Select Committee on Science 
and Technology 2010). I cannot provide here a full account of the power, complexity, and 
mystery of the placebo effect (Harrington 1999), but the fact that it applies to both CAM and 
mainstream medicine further erodes the strict binary between the two.
 The state- sanctioned hierarchies of evidence also shed light on the limitations of the gold 
standard of biomedical knowledge as a measuring instrument for both biomedical and CAM 
therapies and treatments. Read carefully, state- sanctioned hierarchies support a moderate form 
of ‘methodological pluralism’ (Callahan 2004, Cohen 2002–3; see also Welsh et al. 2004). They 
back measuring tools and measureable therapies that stand outside of the highly controlled contexts 
of laboratory science. In addition, they show how under the normative conditions of evidence-
 based medicine (Weisz 2005, Cambrosio et al. 2006, Moreira and Will 2010), even mainstream 
medicine can be, as we saw in the case of surgery, closer to CAM than we might think. In this 
sense, the hierarchies contain built- in openness to CAM, throughout explicit and implicit ana-
logies with non- CAM knowledge.
 Seen in the context of the state–law–science nexus, they indicate that the state is, in prin-
ciple, less directly hostile to CAM knowledge than some accounts might suggest, and they even 
highlight potential ammunition for those who wish to push a regulatory and scientific agenda 
for CAM. This is especially true given that the nexus is itself contestable and contested.
VI Avenues for recognition? CAM research and its nexus with the state
In the UK in 2000, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology emphas-
ized the need for a stronger scientific research base in CAM, especially in relation to efficacy and 
safety of CAM. Further, the Committee had explicitly stated that:
[m]any CAM therapies are based on theories about their modes of action that are not 
congruent with current scientific knowledge. That is not to say that new scientific 
knowledge may not emerge in the future. Nevertheless as a Select Committee on 
Science and Technology we must make it clear from the outset that while we accept 
that some CAM therapies, notably osteopathy, chiropractic and herbal medicine, have 
established efficacy in the treatment of a limited range of ailments, we remain sceptical 
about the modes of action of most of the others.
Ties with the state can be institutional: state funding for research; education training within 
recognized state institutions; ‘legislative recognition, incorporation in various health policies, 
insurance coverage’ (Iyioha 2009). They can also be less immediately tangible and more directly 
related to the knowledge base: informing state policies, being recognized as experts by tribunals, 
and slowly attracting the attention of public and private research funders and sponsors (cf. Press-
man 1998).
 The historian of medicine George Weisz is interested in understanding what exactly makes 
a ‘therapy convincing in one national context and not in another’ (2001: 451). In his work on 
the therapeutic use of thermal waters in twentieth- century France, he notes that students of 
regulation and professionalization of health practices often see, with good reason, power rela-
tionships and the market as the main drivers for regulation and professionalization. However, he 
pointedly warns that we should not forget the critical impact of medical and scientific validation 
itself, that is, not necessarily scientific validity (Iyioha 2011, Casey and Picherack 2001), but 
debates on scientific validity. ‘Battles over the infusion of scientific medicine’ in CAM is thus 
part of the fight for their legitimacy (Welsh et al. 2004: 217).
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 Further, Weisz (2001) highlights the usefulness of ‘specialization’ in national debates on the 
legitimacy of a field of knowledge. In the context of French debates over the legitimacy of 
hydrology, and over whether spa and thermal waters treatment should be covered by national 
health insurance, for example, Weisz points out that specialization broke down broad claims and 
categorized them into different expert claims. In this case, specialization, by reducing the scope 
of claims, made them more convincing for clinicians, who tended to be sceptical towards 
general, grand statements: ‘It is perhaps the very excess of these successes that awakens our mis-
trust to some degree’, a doctor was reported to write about hydrology in 1911 (Weisz 2001). In 
other words, claims that are carefully tailored, toned down, modulated, and coming from a 
restricted specialist field would be more convincing.
 ‘State law’s espousal of science’ (Santos 2002, Iyioha 2011) is, to many, critical to the history 
of exclusion of alternative knowledge systems, whether within or outside the health care domain 
(Iyioha 2009; see also Polich et al. 2010): ‘Historically, state law has been known to espouse the 
dictates of science, and science, bolstered by the force of law, has been deployed as a tool of 
exclusion of nonwestern medical norms’, writes Iyioha (2011: 8; see also Cohen 2004). The 
emergence and current domination of evidence- based medicine (EBM) further consolidated an 
epistemological commonality between law and science which goes back as far as the seven-
teenth century: a ‘concern with degrees of certainty or, in more modern terminology, prob-
ability’ (Shapiro 1983: 168), manifest in ‘emphasis on the grading of evidence on scales of 
reliability and probable truth’ (168). As an enveloping, encompassing paradigm, EBM is more 
controversial than biomedicine: its goal is to trim down as much as possible what it calls ‘biases’, 
that is, any knowledge that is intuitive and unsystematic (EBM Working Group 1992, as cited 
in Micollier 2011; see also Timmermans and Berg 2003). Further drawing on Iyioha, these 
current conditions mean that science ‘sits at the root of the efficacy, safety and regulation debate 
on CAM’ (2011: 8), and that state validation of CAM – via political, economic, statutory, and 
judicial recognition – and scientific validation go hand in hand. Those who pursue CAM 
research and work at situating CAM within the large domain of scientific research are at the 
forefront of this problem.
 There are, however, ongoing debates about whether CAM therapies can be recognized unless 
they can demonstrate that their knowledge passes scientific evidential tests. Willis and White 
(2004) on their part, rather speak of ‘clinical legitimacy’; to them, the patronage of therapy (like 
that of Prince Charles for alternative therapies) and the loyalty of consumers willing to pay for 
CAM could outweigh scientific legitimacy as a basis for ‘politico- legal legitimacy’ (58).
 In a positivist fashion, Casey and Picherack acknowledge that ‘formal bureaucratic organiza-
tional status’ clearly fosters ‘credibility with the dominant structures of the day’ (2001: 69). 
CAM research generally tends to lack such infrastructures. Building such institutional arrange-
ments, and skilful handling of the legalistic language of guidelines, flowcharts, codes of conducts 
and the like, constitute powerful tools of legitimation. With its mimicking of the state’s lan-
guage and audits, the pharmaceutical sector offers a particularly telling illustration (Petryna 2007, 
Jacob and Riles 2007). In addition, and although it has been somewhat overlooked, what makes 
a certain type of medicine (or any type of discipline for that matter) flourish and look successful 
in a particular state is also its main proponents’ flair and agility at institutional and bureaucratic 
politics and their ability ‘to schmooze and negotiate with government bureaucrats’ (see Riles 
2012). This last point makes explicit that CAM is, like other bodies of knowledge, shaped by 
institutional and bureaucratic logics. Its knowledge is purportedly alternative and distinct. 
However, as we saw above, its approach to regulation tends to mimic that of mainstream bio-
medicine. Why is that so? Could it be different?
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VII Concluding thoughts: alternative regulation?
As highlighted above, recent calls by medical law academics for a more ‘holistic’ governance of 
research (Mason and Laurie 2013: 679) resonate with Stone and Matthews’ proposal for holistic 
regulation of CAM (1996: 291). In the conclusion, I would like to explore what an alternative 
regulation of research could look like.
 Recent works on knowledge practices by science and technology studies scholars and anthro-
pologists (e.g. Timmermans and Berg 2003, Gusterson 2003, and Blum 2009) have documented 
a refreshing willingness to critically revisit current scientific research governance and research 
integrity frameworks. As I have discussed elsewhere (Jacob 2011), these accounts provide open-
 minded engagement with other modes of producing and regulating knowledge that do not fit 
with the current research governance frameworks.
 To take one example, historian of science Mario Biagioli (2003) has discussed a practical 
alternative to current research governance norms stemming from his work not on CAM but on 
mainstream science. This radical departure from the current normative framework of research 
governance in the area of authorship comes from the field of particle physics. Biagioli explains 
how, in 1998, the Collider Detector at Fermilab (CDF ) Collaboration14 members appointed 
their own committee to draft bylaws that would regulate the CDF research project with respect 
to authorship, responsibility, and credit. The CDF regulated on the basis of a ‘labor mentality’ 
that accumulates work credit, and is in stark contrast with the ‘originality mentality’ that prevails 
in IP and in biomedical science (ICMJE 1997). Think, for example, of the impact on authorship 
of the following rule on parental and sick leave policies: for up to a year, a member can have his 
or her name appear on all publications produced, ‘based on research they may or may not have 
directly contributed to’ (Biagioli 2003: 270). CDF also puts forward corporate, rather than indi-
vidual, definitions of authorship, credit, and responsibility. As I have discussed elsewhere (Jacob 
2011), Biagioli saw the possibility to redefine these regulatory concepts with respect to research 
because of the specific ‘disciplinary ecology’ (2003: 273) of particle physics: for example, highly 
bureaucratic internal structure, small size, people working together in the same site (in contrast 
to clinical trials in biomedicine, where co- authors may never meet each other).
 I find the example of the CDF useful for thinking about CAM research regulation because 
of the boldness with which particle physics researchers and research administrators rewrote 
mainstream regulatory concepts, establishing their discipline as a genuine alternative. The 
example is also useful because CDF shows that research governance norms – in this case, norms 
of authorship – can hardly be universal, and ought to be linked to the ‘disciplinary ecologies’ of 
fields and practices. Although much CAM research derives out of insights from mainstream sci-
entific research, I suspect some forms of CAM research have many distinct features it could 
build upon while thinking about its own norms of research governance.
 Hence the importance of recalling Porter’s (1989) critical point, on the importance of exam-
ining the self- representation of CAM, in light of CAM practices. There is currently very little 
CAM- ness with respect to research governance per se. Explanations for this could be that CAM 
research is under- funded and barely surviving, and that in this context, proposing a radical, 
transformative alternative is a luxury the CAM research community cannot afford. At the CAM 
conference Regulation and Professionalization in Complementary and Alternative Medicine in May 
2011, I asked the question: Why do CAM researchers not take a more radical, alternative 
approach to research and, for example, rewrite codes of conduct for research like the CDF par-
ticle physicists did? The retort I received was that CAM researchers were less interested in creat-
ing new ways of thinking about research and regulation than about getting standard EBM to 
recognize them. This of course resonated with the ‘old’ problem of negotiating the tension 
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between innovation, recognition, and regulation. Nevertheless, one cannot help but wonder 
whether in the future we will witness even more ethical–legal audacity on the part of those who 
practise and research alternative ways of caring and knowing.
Notes
 1 I wish to thank the Handbook editors, Jean McHale and Nicola Gale, as well as Ruth Fletcher, Tsachi 
Keren- Paz and Michael Thomson for helpful comments. Part of the research was supported by AHRC 
grant no. AH/J008338/1 and by the Centre for Law Ethics and Society at Keele University.
 2 Since 2010, I have been conducting ethnographic fieldwork for the quarterly Forum meetings of the 
Committee on Publication Ethics, and doing legal and archival research of General Medical Council 
research misconduct cases.
 3 For an interesting analogy, see the discussion of Riles (2002) on alternative dispute resolution and its 
immunity to critique.
 4 Already in the nineteenth century, the move towards alternative to regular medicine (‘fringe medi-
cine’) was motivated by disappointment that orthodox medicine caused. Roy Porter (1989) describes 
how CAM in Europe were perceived as a radical dissent and presented themselves as ‘the antithesis of 
an orthodoxy that could be accused of being no less therapeutically foolish then ethically and profes-
sional corrupt’. 
 5 2004/3391, pursuant to the European Communities Act 1972.
 6 The US Office of Research Integrity, the Danish Committee on Scientific Dishonesty, and the Norway 
National Commission for the Investigation of Research Misconduct.
 7 For instance, the joint conference on misconduct in 1999 in Edinburgh, the Research Integrity Futures 
Working Group (2010) and the Research Integrity Concordat (2012).
 8 COPE is an international, London- based advisory body for editors as to how to handle cases of research 
and publication misconduct, including a forum for editors and publishers of peer- reviewed journals to 
discuss all aspects of publication ethics: http://publicationethics.org.
 9 Instead an annual report (which takes the form of a letter) mentions there were 15 this year. We do not 
know, however, how much research activity is occurring in the fields covered by the Complementary 
and Natural Healthcare Council.
10 Also known in the sociology of science as Mode 2 knowledge (Nowotny et al. 2001).
11 Directive 2004/24/EC.
12 Interestingly, in an editorial on the issue of research misconduct, the editor of the journal Complementary 
Therapies in Medicine committed to deal with the problem ‘on a synergetic basis’, a surprising, if not 
alternative, turn of phrase, admittedly rarely found in mainstream writings on research misconduct 
(Van Haselen 2006).
13 The IOM considered the importance of looking at how evidence fares in practice, and thus described 
the components of what an ‘effectiveness RCT’ study would include:
•	 light	patient	exclusion	criteria;
•	 conducted	in	a	range	of	treatment	settings;
•	 treatment	provided	by	the	kinds	of	providers	who	would	provide	treatment	in	non-	study	settings;
•	 no	elaborate	data	collection	(e.g.	extra	lab	test	or	imaging	studies);
•	 analysis	done	on	‘intention	to	treat’	basis;	and
•	 random	assignment	with	one	or	more	control	groups.	
(Institute of Medicine 2005: 96)
14 CDF is a consortium of institutions that provide staff and support the Fermilab laboratory. Potential 
members of CDF are selected by their home institutions to work at Fermilab for a specific period.
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